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ABSTR ACT: The paper examines the effects of the 2013 labour market reform in Slovenia
which made permanent contracts less restrictive and fixed-term contracts more restrictive.
Using matched employer-employee data, the differences in the outcomes for workers employed
under permanent vs. fixed-term contracts before and after the legislative change are compared.
The results show that the reform was successful in both reducing labour market segmentation
and improving access to jobs for vulnerable groups: (i) it increased the probability of accessing
permanent jobs via transitions from both fixed-term jobs and unemployment, and (ii) it
improved the accessibility of permanent jobs for both young and older workers.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In the recent past, the Slovenian labour market was often regarded as rigid and segmented,
thus posing a barrier to faster economic growth and hindering the employment of
vulnerable groups. Before the adoption of the Employment Relationship Act in 2013,
Slovenian employment protection legislation (EPL) was one of the most rigid among
OECD countries and the EU, especially regarding the hiring and firing of permanent
workers. The OECD index of EPL strictness in 2008 was 2.76, placing Slovenia in 20th
place among the 25 EU Member States (Laporšek and Dolenc, 2012). As a consequence,
the labour market was highly segmented between workers with permanent contracts,
with a rich set of benefits, and those on fixed-term contracts, with meagre protections
and benefits. Moreover, the weak ability of firms to adjust to labour market changes – as
documented, among others, by the World Economic Forum (2016) – was increasingly
viewed as a hindrance to the competitiveness of the Slovenian economy.
In Slovenia, the segmentation along the permanent vs. fixed-term divide has become
increasingly pronounced and has particularly affected young workers. In 2011-12, the
incidence of fixed-term contracts in Slovenia was 17.5 percent, compared with 13.5 for the
non-weighted average of OECD countries; among European OECD countries Slovenia’s
1 University of Primorska, Faculty of Management, Koper, Slovenia, e-mail: matija.vodopivec@fm-kp.si
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share lagged only behind Poland, Portugal and Spain (OECD, 2014). Similarly, the share
of fixed-term contracts among new hires has been among the highest in the EU (European
Commission, 2010; OECD, 2014). Young workers have been particularly hurt by this
dichotomy. In 2011, the incidence of temporary contracts (fixed-term, casual, and other
temporary work contracts) among 15-29 year olds in Slovenia was 49.7 percent, compared
to 29.3 percent in European OECD countries – placing Slovenia at the very top of that
list (see also European Commission, 2010, for the analysis of earlier periods).2 Moreover,
while in the majority of European countries young workers have better chances of moving
from a fixed-term to a permanent contract than older workers, Slovenia is one of the few
countries where the opposite is true (European Commission, 2010).
The 2013 Employment Relationship Act (ERA) introduced significant changes aimed at
reducing segmentation and increasing labour market flexibility.On the segmentation front,
the law reduced the difference in costs between employing a worker under a fixed-term
and a permanent contract. For fixed-term workers it introduced severance pay, increased
the unemployment insurance contribution rate, and restricted the leeway for contract
extensions. For permanent workers it reduced the level of severance pay and the advance
notice period, as well as, above all, significantly simplified procedures for the dismissal of
permanent workers. On the flexibility front – beyond reducing the firing costs for workers
under permanent contracts – the law allowed for a more flexible deployment of workers
and introduced the option of monetary compensation instead of reinstatement, among
others. As the result of these changes, the strictness of EPL, as measured by the OECD
EPL index, decreased for both permanent and temporary contracts, with the former being
just below and the latter just above the average for OECD countries (see Section 2 below).
The objective of this paper is to rigorously evaluate whether the 2013 ERA levelled the
playing field; whether it reduced the labour market segmentation between permanent
and fixed-term workers, and whether it improved access to jobs for young and old
workers. Related to labour market segmentation, the paper addresses the following
questions: Has under the new law the probability of obtaining a job under the permanent
– as opposed to the fixed-term contract –increased? For example, has the probability of
obtaining a permanent contract increased for workers employed under the fixed-term
contract? Moreover, has the probability of obtaining a permanent – as opposed to the
fixed-term contract – increased for the unemployed? Related to the availability of jobs
for vulnerable groups, the paper seeks to answer whether the new law increased the
probability of accessing a permanent – as opposed to a fixed-term job –for both young
and older workers. Theoretical predictions of Blanchard (2000) suggest that making EPL
more flexible increases the availability of jobs for vulnerable groups, especially for young
people, because employers prefer to employ workers with previous experience to reduce
the possibility of bad choices. As for older workers, improving their employability was
one of the explicit goals of the new law – the law both raised the age threshold at which
workers are granted special protection against dismissal, as well as removed the dismissal
protection to some groups of old workers (see below).
2 Data on incidence of temporary contracts is computed from: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do.

M. VODOPIVEC | LEVELLING THE PLAYING FIELD: THE EFFECTS OF SLOVENIA’S 2013 LABOUR ...

111

To identify the effects of the legislative changes, the study uses a “double difference”
approach. The specific nature of the labour market reform – the fact that employment
protection has become less restrictive for permanent workers and more restrictive for
fixed-term workers – allows the identification of the effects by comparing differences in
labour market outcomes for these two groups before and after the legislative change.
The key findings of the paper are as follows.  Confronting labour market segmentation, the
new law increased the probability of accessing permanent jobs via transitions from both
unemployment and fixed-term jobs (including transitions from fixed-term to permanent
contracts with the same employer). The reform also helped vulnerable groups; the
probability of accessing permanent jobs increased disproportionally for both young and
older workers.
In what follows, we first provide a brief review of literature about the effects of EPL on
labour market outcomes. Section 3 describes the goals and key changes introduced by
the 2013 ERA. Section 4 proceeds with describing the methodology and the matched
employer-employee database used in the empirical analysis. Section 5 motivates the
empirical analysis by describing the aggregate transitions between labour market states and
presents the results of individual-level transition regressions. The final section concludes.
2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE
The effects of EPL on labour market outcomes have been a subject of a large body of
theoretical and empirical literature focusing on the impact on the level of employment
and unemployment, job and worker flows, and the differential effects on various groups of
workers as well. Most studies find insignificant and some negative effects of rigid EPL on
the level of employment, and no effects on unemployment (see recent reviews by Boeri,
2011, and Betcherman, 2012). More unambiguous are the results of the effects on labour
market dynamics. Recent micro econometric studies indicate that strict regulations
negatively affect worker and job flows and thus labour market transitions. For example,
Autor et al. (2007) show that the adoption of wrongful-discharge protections by state
courts in the United States had a negative effect on job flows and firm entries. Similarly,
Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004) find that reduction in dismissal costs increased accessions as
well as separations of workers in Colombia. The negative impact of employment protection
on turnover was confirmed also by cross-country studies performed on aggregate data
(Gomez-Salvador et al., 2004; Messina and Vallanti, 2007; Boeri and Garibaldi, 2009),
as well as by studies using difference-in-differences approaches on OECD countries (see
Micco and Pages, 2006; Haltiwanger et al., 2014; Bassanini et al., 2010; Cingano et al.,
2010; and OECD, 2010).
Particularly interesting for the present study are the results concerning the effects of partial
EPL reforms in Southern European countries, which typically reduced the stringency of
fixed-term contracts while keeping EPL for permanent contracts unchanged. Bentolila
et al. (2008) show that the 1984 Spanish reform liberalizing fixed-term contracts led to
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a strong substitution of permanent with fixed-term contracts (whose share in aggregate
employment reached 35 percent in the early 1990s), an increase in worker turnover rate,
and a reduction in the long-term unemployment rate. Because firms used layoffs as a
normal practice, the conversion rates into permanent contracts were reduced from 18
percent in 1987 to 5 percent in 1994. Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (2014) also find
that the reform mildly increased total employment and firm productivity. The findings of
Blanchard and Landier (2002) in the case of France are similar. Following the introduction
of fixed-term contracts in the early 1980s for workers aged 20-24, the proportion of
fixed-term contracts increased significantly, whereas conversion rates from temporary
to permanent work decreased. The duration of unemployment and the probability of
becoming unemployed decreased as well, but only in the early period. In Italy, the reform
in the early 1990s introduced higher costs for unjust dismissals of permanent workers for
businesses below 15 workers. That resulted in a more intensive use of temporary contracts
and had a negligible effect on net employment (Kugler and Pica, 2008). Boeri and Jimeno
(2005) also find that stricter EPL reduces dismissals of permanent workers, as opposed to
fixed-term workers.
3 KEY CHANGES INTRODUCED BY THE 2013 ERA
The new Employment Relationship Act (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No.
21/2013) came into effect on April 12, 2013 as part of a comprehensive labour market
reform aiming at establishing an adequate balance between employment security and
flexibility. The new law pursued two main goals: (i) reducing labour market segmentation
and (ii) increasing flexibility (Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs and Equal
Opportunities, 2013). The new law also strengthened legal protection in areas where
workers in the past were subject to insufficient protection or misuse.
3.1 Reduction of labour market segmentation
One of the major goals of the ERA was to foster employment under permanent contracts
while curbing employment under fixed-term contracts, as well as to stimulate the
employment of older workers. Important changes introduced by the law are described
below.
The 2013 law introduced a variety of changes that reduced the cost of employment under
the permanent as opposed to the fixed-term contract. On the one hand, employment
under permanent contracts was made more attractive from the perspective of employers.
This was achieved by shortening the period of advance notice and monetary costs of
layoffs (for example, in case of business reasons, the maximum advance notification
period was shortened from 120 to 60 days), by reducing severance pay in cases of layoffs
for business reasons or incapacity, and by limiting severance pay upon retirement, as
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well as in-kind work benefits.3 Moreover, a number of provisions were delegated to the
existing collective agreements, including transportation allowances and wage premium
associated with work experience. Very importantly, the law also simplified procedures for
termination of employment under permanent contracts. For example, before laying off a
worker, the employer is no longer liable to offer him/her another suitable job within the
firm; the employer can terminate the probationary period before the planned end, and the
new law no longer calls for reinstatement and it allows for monetary compensation to be
paid instead. Moreover, the law exempted permanent contract hires from the payment of
unemployment insurance contributions for the first two years.
On the other hand, employment under fixed-term contracts was made more restrictive and
less attractive. This was achieved by imposing stricter conditions on the use of fixed-term
contracts, introducing severance pay for fixed-term contracts, charging a five-fold higher
contribution rate for unemployment insurance for hires under fixed-term as opposed to
permanent contracts (in duration of two years), and limiting the use of temporary work
agency workers employed under fixed-term contracts.
With the goal of increasing employment opportunities for older workers, the ERA
introduced two types of changes. First, it raised the age threshold at which workers are
granted special protection against dismissal. Starting in 2017, special protection against
dismissal is given to workers who fulfill the age requirement of 58 years or to workers who
otherwise do not meet the age requirement but qualify for retirement within five years (in
the interim period, the age threshold was synchronized with the retirement age that was
also gradually raised). Second, the dismissal protection is not granted to workers who,
at the time of hiring, already pass across the threshold of protection dismissal (however,
protection dismissal is kept by workers who conclude a new contract by forfeiting the
present employment).
3.2 Increase of labour market flexibility
Several measures aiming at reducing labour market segmentation served also to increase
labour market flexibility. These are the measures for making employment protection
under permanent contracts less strict, as well as the measures for reducing the special
protection of older workers (see above). Several other measures of the ERA also increased
labour market flexibility. First, the law reduced limits on the use of temporary agency
workers, particularly in cases of workers employed by these agencies under permanent
contracts. Second, the law increased internal labour flexibility of firms by both increasing
the possibilities for internal redeployment and introducing temporary lay-offs, whereby
a worker can be laid off for up to six months a year, with the employer being responsible
for paying out 80 percent of the wage (and not 100 percent as under the old law). And
3 The relevant reductions in severance pay are as follows: under the previous law, workers with 5-10 years of
tenure were entitled to an average of 1.9 months of severance pay, to be contrasted with 1.5 months under
the new law; and workers with 16-20 years of tenure were previously entitled to an average of 6 months of
severance pay, to be contrasted with 4.5 months under the new law.
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third, during the layoff advance notification period the law granted the worker the right
to participate in employment programs organized by public employment offices for one
day a week.
Note, however, that the 2013 Employment Relationship Act includes also some provisions
that impede labour market flexibility. These provisions, above all, relate to limitations on
the use and the increase of costs of fixed-term contracts (see above).
3.3 The resulting changes of the EPL index
After the introduction of the ERA, the strictness of EPL in Slovenia, as measured by the
OECD EPL index, fell considerably. Above all, the EPL index for individual and collective
dismissals (permanent contracts) decreased from 2.67 to 2.39 (which is still slightly above
the non-weighted average of 2.28 for OECD countries), while the EPL index for individual
dismissals for permanent contracts dropped to 1.99, just below the OECD average of 2.04
(Table 1). Despite the increase in rigidity associated with fixed-term contracts, the EPL
index for temporary contracts also decreased, from 2.50 to 2.13 – a change that happened
due to the decrease in the restrictions on the use of temporary work agencies outweighing
the increase restrictiveness on fixed-term contracts.4 Despite the decrease, the EPL index
for temporary contracts remains slightly above the non-weighted average of 2.08 for
OECD countries.
Table 1: The OECD index of the strictness of employment protection legislation in Slovenia,
before and after the enactment of the 2013 ERA

Slovenia – 2013, old ERA
Slovenia – 2013, new ERA
OECD average – 2013 (unweighted)

Individual
and collective
dismissals
(permanent
contracts)

Individual
dismissals
(permanent
contracts)

Collective
dismissals
(additional
restrictions)

Temporary
contracts

2.67
2.39
2.28

2.39
1.99
2.04

3.38
3.38
2.90

2.50
2.13
2.08

Source: OECD (2015).

It is useful to put the nature and intensity of Slovenia’s 2013 reform into further
perspective. Using the classifications introduced by Boeri (2011), the introduction of the
2013 Slovenian Employment Relationship Act can be labelled as “complete” (rather than
“two-tier”), since the share of the population potentially affected by the reform represents
4 Note that the OECD index of strictness of temporary contracts fails to account for two specific features
introduced by the 2013 ERA, namely for the imposition of (i) the obligation of paying severance pay to fixedterm workers, and (ii) a higher contribution rate for unemployment insurance for hires under fixed-term as
opposed to permanent contracts. Therefore, the reduction of the temporary contracts index associated with
the introduction of the 2013 law presented in Table 1 is overestimated.
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more than 50 percent of the potentially eligible population. Moreover, the reform may also
be labelled as “incremental“ (rather than “discrete”), as the regulatory change lags behind
the changes in many other countries – see the comparison of the intensity of changes in
the indices of individual dismissals (permanent contracts) and temporary contracts in
Slovenia and other OECD countries in Figure 1.5
Figure 1: Intensity of EPL reforms, Slovenia and other OECD countries, 2008-13

Source: OECD (2015).

4 METHODOLOGY AND DATA
In this section, we first outline the strategy to identify labour market effects of the legislative
changes, and then a specification of models to be estimated is presented.
4.1 Identification strategy
Identification of the impact of the legislative changes takes advantage of the specific
nature of the labour market reform that allows the use of a quasi-experimental approach.
The 2013 labour reform made employment under permanent contracts less restrictive
and employment under fixed-term contracts more restrictive, which allows the use of
the difference-in-differences methodology to identify the reform effects (comparing the
differences in outcomes for workers employed under permanent vs. fixed-term contracts,
before and after the legislative change).
5 In determining whether the Slovenian reform was incremental or discrete, we follow Boeri’s (2011)
classification only heuristically, not computationally.
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The advantage of the proposed difference-of-differences method is that it controls for
different characteristics of individuals included in the treatment and control groups,
including the unobserved ones. This advantage arises because by comparing the outcomes
of the same group of individuals before and after the treatment, the method eliminates the
effect of time invariant and group-level characteristics, including the unobserved ones.
On the other hand, the method has also important potential weaknesses that stem from its
assumptions. Above all, the method rests on the “equal trends assumption”, requiring that
in the absence of treatment, the outcomes of the treatment and control groups have equal
trends. When these trends differ, the method generates biased results (Blundell and Costa
Dias, 2008, Gertler et al 2011). The difference-of-differences method is also sensitive to
unobserved individual-specific shocks that influence the decision to participate in the
treatment group (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2008). For example, individuals experiencing
a “dip” in their earnings are more likely to enrol in a training program, resulting in
difference-of-differences estimator overestimating an increase of earnings among the
treated – those enrolled in training (the so-called Ashenfelter’s dip).
4.2
Estimation model of worker transitions
4.2 Estimation model of worker transitions
To analyse the impact of the changed legislation on transitions between various
To analyse
the impact
changed legislation
on transitions
betweenisvarious
labour
market
states,ofa the
multinomial
logistic regression
framework
used. labour
Under
market
states,
a
multinomial
logistic
regression
framework
is
used.
Under
this
framework,
this framework, individuals can transition to multiple, competing states – in
our case,
individuals
can transition
to multiple,
competingcontracts
states – in our
case,with
to permanent
or fixedto
permanent
or fixed-term
employment
(either
the existing
or
term
employment
contracts
(either
with
the
existing
or
another
employer,
if
applicable),
another employer, if applicable), unemployment (with or without unemployment
unemployment
(with orEach
without
unemployment
benefits),
inactivity.with
Eacha of
these
benefits),
or inactivity.
of these
J competing
states isorassociated
specific
J competing states is associated with a specific monthly transition probability
monthly transition probability
Pr(𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚|𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑿𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 , 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏) =

exp�𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑿𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 `𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚|𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 �

∑𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 exp(𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑿𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 `𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗|𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 )

, with 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽 ,

(1)

where 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 denotes one of the 𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽 labour market states, 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 is the base category, and 𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑿 is a
set of control variables. For example, taking fixed-term employment (Efixed) as the
base category, the probability of receiving a permanent contract with the same
employer (Eperm) can be expressed as
Pr(𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚|𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑿𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 , 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸) =

exp�𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑿𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 `𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚|𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏=𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 �
𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽

1+∑𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=2 exp(𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑿𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 `𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗|𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏=𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 )

.

(2)

The results we present are expressed as the ratio of the predicted probabilities of a
given outcome compared to the baseline outcome; e.g. in the case above, the relative
probability of conversion from a fixed-term contract to a permanent contract is:
Pr(𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚|𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑿𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 , 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸)
= exp�𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑿𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 `𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸|𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏=𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 � .
Pr(𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸|𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑿𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 , 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸)

(3)

The example presented in (3) can identify the causal effect of the increased rigidity in
fixed-term contracts and decreased rigidity in permanent contracts via double
differences: (i) by comparing the two differentially-affected labour segments, and (ii)

The results we present are expressed as the ratio of the predicted probabilities of a
given outcome compared to the baseline outcome; e.g. in the case above, the relative
probability of conversion from a fixed-term contract to a permanent contract is:
Pr(𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚|𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑿𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 , 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸)
= EFFECTS
exp�𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑿𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 `𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽
.
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SLOVENIA’S 2013
...
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 �LABOUR
Pr(𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸|𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑿𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 , 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸)

(3)
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The example presented in (3) can identify the causal effect of the increased rigidity in
fixed-term contracts and decreased rigidity in permanent contracts via double
differences: (i) by comparing the two differentially-affected labour segments, and (ii)
by exploiting the time-series variation. To account for the latter, the set of
explanatory variables 𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑿 contains an indicator variable for the time period after which
the reforms were enacted. Because the reforms went into effect on April 12, 2013, we
exclude the month of April from the analysis by including an indicator variable for
that month. Furthermore, when labour market state 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 pertains to unemployment, we
include a dummy variable controlling for the receipt of unemployment benefits. In
addition, the explanatory variables 𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑿 contain variables for demographic
characteristics (gender, age, education) and monthly control variables to account for
seasonality in worker separations and accessions.

4.3 Data description

12

The study takes advantage of an exceptionally rich database, created by merging
administrative data covering the entire Slovenian workforce. The database contains
information on the history of employment, unemployment, and wages for the entire work
career for each individual for the 1991-2016 period. Each employment spell is linked
with the financial and other information of the employer, with all firms in Slovenia being
included (the so-called matched employer-employee database). The following data sets
are included in the combined database:
(a) Work history data set. It contains information on the starting and the ending date of an
employment spell, the type of appointment, occupation, the employer identification
code, and personal characteristics (gender, age, and education). Through the employer
identification code, each employment spell is linked to accounting data on the current
employer.
(b) Data set on registered unemployment. It contains the starting and the ending date,
destination of exit, as well as information on the receipt of unemployment insurance
benefits. Some additional personal and family characteristics, pertaining to each spell,
are also included.
(c) Workers’ earnings data set. It contains information on earnings associated with each
post-1991 employment spell of an individual (the amount of earnings, number of
hours worked, the starting and ending date of the earnings period).
(d) Accounting data on enterprises. Data consist of yearly profit and loss statements, as
well as balance sheets, for all incorporated businesses in Slovenia.
(e) Slovenian Business Registry data set includes information on the four-digit industry,
the year the firm started operating, and the firm’s type and ownership structure (private
and state ownership, ownership by domestic and foreign owners, and whether a firm
is a publicly traded stock company or a limited liability company).
The resulting database used as the basis for this analysis contains over 18 million
observations at the level of monthly individual states (Table A1), spanning the period from
April 2012 to March 2014. The large majority of these observations refer to permanent
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employment, mirroring the fact that permanent employment comprises the largest share
of stock of labour market participants. Men tend to be disproportionally represented
among the unemployed and in fixed-term contracts relative to their share in permanent
employment; the lesser educated tend to be disproportionally unemployed, while the
highest educated tend to be disproportionally employed under permanent contracts.
In an attempt to exclude spurious worker flows, we account for changes in employment
that reflect worker re-registrations due to organizational and other changes of employers.
For the purposes of the analysis, we therefore exclude all worker accessions and separations
between pairs of accounting entities for which, in a given month, more than 10 job-to-job
transfers of individuals on permanent contracts were observed.
5 RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, pre- and post-reform dynamics in aggregate labour market outcomes are
contrasted, afterwards followed by the results of individual-level transition regressions.
5.4 Dynamics of labour market transitions
Comparing the transition matrices across labour market states before and after the
legislative change provide some clues about the labour market impact of the 2013 ERA on
accessing permanent employment. As shown in Table A2, the transition rate from fixedterm employment to permanent employment with the same employer in the period after
the legislative change shows a marked increase of 0.46 percentage points (5.4 percentage
points at the annual level – Table A2, Panel C), whereas the transition rate from fixed-term
employment to permanent employment with a new employer shows an increase of 0.09
percentage points (1.1 percentage points at the annual level – Table A2, Panel C). Moreover,
in the period after the legislative change, the transition rate from unemployment with
unemployment benefits to permanent employment increased by 0.26 percentage points
(3.1 percentage points at the annual level – Table A2, Panel C); note that the transition rate
from unemployment without receiving benefits slightly declined.
The transition matrix also highlights a more stagnant nature of the Slovenian labour
market compared to other EU countries. Bachmann et al (2015), for example, report
annual persistency rates in permanent employment of 89.7 percent for a panel of 24 EU
countries; the comparable figure calculated from the Slovenian administrative data is 91.9
percent.6

6 Note that the figures are not directly comparable due to differences in data sources and definitions –
Bachmann et al. (2015) use EU-SILC survey data and directly examine annual persistency rates, while the
figures for Slovenia are calculated from monthly transition rates. Also note that figures refer to comparable
time periods.
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5.5 Results of the estimation of multinomial logit models of labour market transitions
In this section, the results of multinomial regressions of transitions across various labour
market states are presented. There are three types of transitions described: from fixed-term
employment, from permanent employment, and from unemployment. In the estimated
models, the following destinations are considered: fixed-term employment, permanent
employment, unemployment with receiving benefits, unemployment, inactivity, and selfemployment (that includes other types of exits). In transition models with employment as
the origin labour-market state, a further distinction is made between employment with a
new as opposed to the current employer.
The estimated models follow the multinomial logit specification from equation (1) above,
with key parameters of interest being the parameters showing the difference-in-differences
effect on the selected outcome (see the methodology section above). As control variables,
gender, age, and education are included, all expressed as categorical variables. Because
the outcomes for young and older workers are of particular interest, models are estimated
separately by age categories. Relative risk ratios are reported.
5.2.1 Transition from fixed-term employment
The new law increased the relative probability of transition from a fixed-term to a
permanent contract. We distinguish between two types of these transitions, one in which
a fixed-term contract is converted into a permanent contract with the same employer,
and another one where an individual gets a permanent position with another employer.
First, as shown in Table A3, under the new law the probability of transitioning to a new
permanent job with another employer increased by 18.9 percent in comparison to the
pre-reform period, and the probability of transitioning to a new fixed-term job with
another employer decreased by 9.9 percent (Table A3, coefficients under “New Law”). The
relative probability of transitioning to a permanent contract (as opposed to transitioning
to a fixed-term contract) thus increased by 32 percent. Second, under the new law, the
probability of transition from a fixed-term contract to a permanent contract with the
same employer increased by 28.2 percent.7 Note that this applies for the chosen baseline
characteristics (men younger than 30 years, with elementary education). Under the new
law, the probability of transitions to other destinations (inactivity, covered and uncovered
unemployment, and other) also changed, but these changes cannot be attributed to the
change of the law alone, as in all likelihood, they reflect also changes in other circumstances.
While not directly tied to the legislative changes, it is interesting to note that employment
outcomes generally tend to be superior for men and more highly educated individuals
(Table A3). Although they have a higher probability of transitioning to self-employment,
7 Note that in Table A3, the coefficient for “Permanent employment – same employer” under “New law”
already reflects a double difference. In contrast, coefficients under “New law” for “Fixed-term employment –
new employer” and “Permanent employment – new employer” reflect only the “before-after” difference and a
double difference is obtained by their division (as coefficients are relative risk ratios).
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women under fixed-term contracts tend to have a lower probability for continuous
regular employment in any form, permanent or fixed-term, and with either their current
or another employer. They also have a higher probability of exiting to unemployment
(although intriguingly, not inactivity). More highly educated individuals, on the other
hand, have a higher probability of transitioning to permanent contracts (either with their
current or a new employer) and a lower probability of transitioning to unemployment;
similarly to women, they have a higher probability of becoming self-employed and a lower
probability of becoming inactive.
Relative probabilities of transitions from fixed-term employment do not vary strongly
across age groups. As shown in Table A4, under the new law the probability of transitioning
to a new permanent job with another employer increased for all age groups, and the
probability of transitioning to a new fixed-term job with another employer decreased for
all age groups, with no group showing particular advantage over the others. Interestingly,
the conversion of a fixed-term to a permanent contract with the same employer recorded
the highest probability among 30 to 39 year olds.
5.2.2 Transition from permanent employment
The new law increased the relative probability of transition from a permanent to another
permanent contract with a new employer for both young and older workers. In the
aggregate, under the new law the probability of transition from a permanent to another
permanent contract with a new employer decreased by 8.9 percent, nearly precisely by as
much as the probability of transition to a fixed-term contract with a new employer did,
leaving the relative probability unchanged (Table A5). But both young and older workers
fared better: for the younger ones (aged 16-29), the relative probability of accessing another
permanent contract with a new employer increased by 7.6 percent, and for the older ones
(older than 55 years) by 32 percent (Table A6). The explanation for the latter effect can be
found in the new law; with the intention of an increasing access to jobs for older workers,
dismissal protection stopped to be granted to job movers older than 55.
Other results show that probabilities of transition from a permanent to another permanent
or to a fixed-term contract with a new employer differ across various groups (Table A5).
Women are less likely to change their employers than men, particularly when exiting to
a fixed-term employment. Interestingly, the more educated are less likely to transition
from a permanent to a fixed-term contract or to another permanent contract with a new
employer, except the ones with tertiary education, when making transition from one
permanent job to another permanent job.
5.2.3 Transition from unemployment
Although the new law coincided with the increase in the outflows from unemployment
to both fixed-term and permanent employment, the increase in outflows to permanent
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employment was significantly greater.8 Transitions to permanent contracts increased by
12.1 percent, whereas transitions to fixed-term contracts increased by only 2.7 percent
(a difference that is statistically significant). Interestingly, transitions to self-employment
decreased, a finding that is attributable to the fact that subsidies for self-employment were
offered to the unemployed to a greater extent in the year prior to the change in legislation.
Transitions from unemployment show that the new law improved accessibility of
permanent jobs to both young and older workers (Table A7). For younger workers, the exit
rate to both fixed-term and permanent employment increased by 15.3 percent and 29.4
percent, respectively; the increase to permanent employment was statistically significantly
larger (and amounted to 12.2 percent, taking the ratio of the two coefficients) – see Table
A8. For older workers, the exit rate to fixed-term employment decreased by almost 30
percent, while the exit rate to permanent employment increased, although the latter
was not statistically significantly relative to the baseline of the remaining unemployed.
Relative to the exit rate to fixed-term employment, however, the change was statistically
significant and large in magnitude, amounting to 62 percent. For the other age groups, the
relative probabilities to transition from unemployment to either fixed-term or permanent
employment were statistically not significantly different from each other.
The finding that transitions into permanent employment increased significantly for the
oldest workers can be explained by the legislative changes which selectively reduced the
firing costs for precisely those workers, while leaving them unchanged for younger ones.
Prior to the implementation of the new law, workers aged 55 and over were categorically
guaranteed job security; layoffs were possible only in cases of gross negligence. As
explained above, according to the new law, this special protection no longer applies for
the new hires who are above the age threshold at the time of the hire.9 As such, employers
have a much stronger incentive to hire older workers who are above the age threshold,
while continued disincentives are in place for hiring workers just below the age threshold
(who will soon be subject to the increased job security).
The exit rates from unemployment to employment across demographic characteristics
are consistent with those found in other studies (e.g. Bachmann et al., 2015). Women are
found to have lower rates of exiting unemployment to either permanent or fixed-term
employment than men, but not to self-employment. Exit rates to regular employment
decrease with age, while exit rates to self-employment increase with age (although in
general,exit rates to self-employment are much lower than to regular employment).Finally,
higher levels of education are associated with much higher exit rates to employment in
general, and permanent or self-employment in particular.

8 Note that the statistics reported here refer to exits from both covered and uncovered unemployment.
9 The precise stipulations for what constitutes an older workers are slightly more complicated: they were lower
for women prior to April 2013, are gradually increasing over time, and are also linked to the age at which
individuals may retire. These factors are taken into account in the empirical analysis but are not referred to
in the text for simplicity of exposition.
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6 CONCLUSION
The results of the paper indicate that the 2013 Employment Relations Act achieved its
stated goals of reducing labour market segmentation, as well as improving access to jobs
of vulnerable groups. On the labour market segmentation front, the new law increased the
probability of accessing permanent jobs: (i) the probability of conversion from a fixedterm to a permanent contract with the same employer increased, (ii) workers employed
under fixed-term contracts increased the probability of obtaining a permanent rather
than a fixed-term job with another employer, and (iii) unemployed workers increased
the probability of obtaining a permanent rather than a fixed-term job. On the vulnerable
groups front, the new law improved accessibility of permanent jobs both for young and
older workers. Younger workers can better access permanent jobs via transitions from
unemployment and permanent contracts; older workers have a better access to permanent
jobs via transitions from unemployment as well as from another permanent job.
Slovenia’s 2013 ERA reduced job security for permanent workers and increased the costs
associated with fixed-term employment; the above results suggest that this strategy has
paid off. The “completeness of the reform” – the fact that the reform affected both fixedterm and permanent contracts – may well have contributed to favourable outcomes. It is
also worth singling out favourable outcomes for the group of old workers (55 and older)
– with the intention of increasing access to jobs for older workers, the new law stopped
granting special dismissal protection to job-movers aged 55 or over. The findings of the
paper indeed show favourable changes regarding this group: older workers were the only
group for which under the new law the relative probability of transition from a fixed-term
to a permanent contract with another employer increased, and they also faced favourable
trends in transitions from both permanent jobs as well as unemployment.
The above results need to be qualified in several ways. First, it has to be recognized that
2013, the year of ERA introduction, was a turning point for the Slovenian economy, when
the recovery from the 2008 recession began in earnest. Under such circumstances, the
equal trend assumption that underlies the difference-in-differences approach may have
been violated – conceivably, during the recovery the incentives of firms to attract new
workers by offering them permanent employment contracts increased. The results of the
paper may therefore partially reflect such a change in incentives and cannot be exclusively
interpreted as the impact of the new law. Second, the results are of partial equilibrium
nature, thus ignoring general equilibrium effects of the new law. Such effects can be
substantial and involve, among others, interactions between temporary and permanent
contracts (for a theoretical modelling of “two-tier reforms” see Boeri 2011). Third, the
analysis is limited in that it examines the short-term results of the legislative change that
limit the possibility of generalizing the estimated effects – applying the analysis to a longer
time series may improve the reliability of the results and, by investigating longer-term
effects, increase their richness.
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0.48

Women

0.29
0.33
0.15
0.12

Age 30-39

Age 40-49

Age 50-55

Age 55+

0.33
0.32

General secondary education

Tertiary education

2,173,943

0.26

0.30

0.28

0.16

0.05

0.08

0.23

0.35

0.28

0.41

0.59

Fixed-term employment

2,009,846

0.13

0.27

0.25

0.19

0.22

0.12

0.18

0.22

0.25

0.46

0.54

Unemployed

18,112,700

0.20

0.25

0.24

0.22

0.14

0.14

0.29

0.28

0.15

0.45

0.55

Entire sample

Source: Own calculations based on combined unemployment and employment registry data, Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia.

Note: Unit of observation is the monthly labour market status at the individual level. Data cover a two year period prior to and following the April 2013 labour market reform.

13,928,911

0.23

Technical secondary education

Number of observations

0.12

Primary education

Education

0.10

Age under 30

Age

0.52

Permanent employment

Men

Gender

Variable

Labour market state

Table A1: Summary statistics of key variables (mean values of binary variables)
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Origin

Origin

Destination
Fixed-term
employment –
same employer
90.4
0.0
0.0
n.a.
n.a.

Destination
Fixed-term
employment –
same employer
90.6
0.0
0.0
n.a.
n.a.

Fixed-term
employment –
new employer
1.5
0.1
0.3
4.5
2.4

Fixed-term
employment –
new employer
1.7
0.1
0.4
4.2
2.5

Permanent
Permanent
employment – employment –
same employer new employer
2.4
0.6
98.9
0.3
0.6
0.3
n.a.
1.2
n.a.
0.5

Permanent
Permanent
employment – employment –
same employer new employer
1.9
0.5
98.9
0.3
0.4
0.2
n.a.
1.0
n.a.
0.5

Other
Unemployment Unemployment
employment
–with unemp.
–without
(e.g., self-emp.)
benefits
unemp. benefits
0.3
1.9
1.0
0.1
0.2
0.1
96.8
0.4
0.2
0.9
83.0
0.1
0.4
n.a.
93.9

Other
Unemployment Unemployment
employment
–with unemp.
–without
(e.g., self-emp.)
benefits
unemp. benefits
0.4
2.4
0.7
0.1
0.3
0.0
97.5
0.5
0.1
1.2
84.8
0.2
0.3
n.a.
93.5

2.0
0.3
1.4
10.2
2.7

Inactivity

1.8
0.2
0.9
8.6
3.0

Inactivity

100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

Total

100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
99.9

Total

Destination
Fixed-term
Fixed-term
Permanent
Permanent
Other
Unemployment Unemployment Inactivity
Total
employment employment - employment - employment employment
-with unemp. -without unemp.
same employer new employer same employer new employer (e.g., self-emp.)
benefits
benefits
Fixed-term employment
-0.26
-0.15
0.46
0.09
-0.11
-0.50
0.33
0.14
0.0
Permanent employment
0.00
-0.01
0.05
-0.01
-0.02
-0.11
0.04
0.06
0.0
Other employment (e.g., self-employment)
0.01
-0.05
0.25
0.04
-0.70
-0.12
0.06
0.51
0.0
Unemployment (with unemp. benefits)
n.a.
0.34
n.a.
0.26
-0.29
-1.83
-0.07
1.58
0.0
Unemployment (without unemp. benefits)
n.a.
-0.09
n.a.
-0.03
0.05
n.a.
0.42
-0.32
0.0
Note: Contains averages of monthly transition probabilities from April 2012 to March 2013 (the period prior to the legislative change) and May 2013 to April 2014 (the period the after legislative change).
Source: Own calculations based on combined unemployment and employment registry data, Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia.

Panel C: Difference = Panel B-Panel A
Origin

Fixed-term employment
Permanent employment
Other employment (e.g., self-employment)
Unemployment (with unemp. benefits)
Unemployment (without unemp. benefits)

Panel B: New law

Fixed-term employment
Permanent employment
Other employment (e.g., self-employment)
Unemployment (with unemp. benefits)
Unemployment (without unemp. benefits)

Panel A: Old law

Table A2: Monthly transition matrix – comparison of the old and the new law (in percent)
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Table A3: Multinomial logit estimates of the monthly probability of transition from fixedterm employment to different labour market states
Relative risk ratio of transition from fixed-term employment into:
Permanent
Unemployment Fixed-term
Permanent Unemployment
employment
SelfInactivity
- without
employment - employment - - with unemp.
- same
employment
unemp. benefits new employer new employer
benefits
employer
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Effects of the legislative changes (baseline: old law)
New law
1.282***
1.039***
1.461***
0.901***
1.189***
0.809***
0.732***
(0.013)
(0.011)
(0.023)
(0.01)
(0.023)
(0.008)
(0.017)
Gender
(baseline: men)
Women
0.945***
0.713***
1.527***
0.721***
0.810***
1.437***
1.790***
(0.008)
(0.009)
(0.026)
(0.01)
(0.017)
(0.014)
(0.045)
Age (baseline: under 30 years
old)
Aged 30-39
1.189***
0.746***
0.912***
1.049***
1.060***
1.143***
1.053*
(0.011)
(0.01)
(0.018)
(0.015)
(0.023)
(0.014)
(0.028)
Aged 40-49
1.098***
0.705***
1.066***
1.149***
1.080***
1.436***
0.920**
(0.013)
(0.012)
(0.024)
(0.019)
(0.028)
(0.02)
(0.033)
Aged 50-55
0.910***
0.666***
1.458***
1.028
0.796***
1.977***
0.978
(0.018)
(0.017)
(0.044)
(0.027)
(0.035)
(0.037)
(0.054)
Aged 55+
0.937**
0.666***
1.185***
0.802***
0.539***
3.082***
0.813***
(0.024)
(0.022)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.037)
(0.059)
(0.059)
Education (baseline: primary school or
less)
Secondary
school
1.199***
0.673***
1.086***
0.954***
1.054*
1.029*
1.191***
(technical)
(0.017)
(0.01)
(0.027)
(0.016)
(0.031)
(0.015)
(0.052)
Tertiary
1.492***
0.294***
0.671***
0.519***
1.082**
0.774***
1.723***
(0.022)
(0.006)
(0.019)
(0.011)
(0.035)
(0.013)
(0.073)
Constant
(baseline risk
0.012***
0.068***
0.004***
0.025***
0.005***
0.016***
0.001***
ratio)
(0)
(0.002)
(0)
(0.001)
(0)
(0)
(0)
Number of
48,397
39,338
17,578
34,462
11,802
47,479
7,674
transitions
Number of
2,173,943
observations
Pseudo
0.027
R-squared
Note: Coefficients denote relative risk ratios obtained from multinomial logit regressions, where relative risk ratios are defined
as the relative probability of observing a given outcome relative to the base outcome. Additional covariates included in the
regressions include 11 dummy variables for calendar months and a dummy variable for April 2013. The regressions are estimated
for monthly transitions from April 2012 to April 2014, thus including 12 months before and after the legislative change (in
addition to April 2013, when the new law went into effect in the middle of the month). *, ** and *** denote statistical significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors clustered by individual are in parentheses.
Source: Own calculations based on combined unemployment and employment registry data, Statistical Office of the
Republic of Slovenia.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

(0.065)

1.781***

(0.051)

1.681***

(0.027)

1.122***

(3)

Unemployment
– without
unemp. benefits

n.a.

n.a.

(0.022)

0.890***

(0.019)

0.930***

(0.016)

0.887***

(4)

Fixed-term
employment – new
employer

n.a.

n.a.

(0.053)

1.224***

(0.04)

1.193***

(0.035)

1.207***

(5)

(0.019)

0.543***

(0.024)

0.768***

(0.016)

0.751***

(0.015)

0.808***

(0.015)

0.926***

(6)

Permanent
Unemployment – with
employment – new
unemp. benefits
employer

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

(0.032)

0.771***

(0.027)

0.757***

(7)

Self-employment

Note: Coefficients denote relative risk ratios obtained from separate multinomial logistic regressions estimated by age group. Relative risk ratios are defined as the relative probability of observing a
given outcome relative to the base outcome. For each age group, the following covariates are included: gender, education (4 categories), dummy variables for calendar months and a dummy variable
for April 2013. “n.a.” refers to labour market states/transitions for which there were too few observations for reliable estimates. The regressions are estimated for monthly transitions from April 2012
to April 2014, thus including 12 months before and after the legislative change (in addition to April 2013, when the new law went into effect in the middle of the month). *, ** and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors clustered by individual are in parentheses.
Source: Own calculations based on combined unemployment and employment registry data, Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia.

n.a.

Aged 55+

n.a.

(0.026)
n.a.

1.015
(0.025)

1.135***

(0.022)

(0.027)

(0.015)
1.122***

(0.019)
1.541***

1.011

1.202***

(2)

(1)

Aged 50-55

Aged 40-49

Aged 30-39

Aged 16-29

Effects of the new law, age-specific effects

Inactivity

Permanent
employment –
same employer

Relative risk ratio of transition from fixed-term employment into:

Table A4: Multinomial logit estimates of the monthly probability of transition from fixed-term employment to different labour market states – agespecific effects of the legislative changes
(relative risk ratios)
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Table A5: Multinomial logit estimates of the monthly probability of transition from permanent
employment to different labour market states
Inactivity
(1)

Relative risk ratio of transition from permanent employment into:
Unemployment
Fixed-term
Permanent
Unemployment
Self– without
employment – employment – – with unemp.
employment
unemp. benefits new employer new employer
benefits
(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Effects of the legislative changes (baseline: old law)
New law
Gender (baseline:
men)
Women

0.850***

2.384***

0.913***

0.911***

0.602***

0.654***

(0.011)

(0.074)

(0.017)

(0.009)

(0.007)

(0.014)

0.799***

0.961

0.602***

0.818***

0.857***

0.900***

(0.01)

(0.028)

(0.012)

(0.009)

(0.01)

(0.019)

Age (baseline: under 30 years old)
Aged 30-39
Aged 40-49
Aged 50-55
Aged 55+

0.536***

0.790***

0.997

1.310***

1.224***

1.363***

(0.013)

(0.031)

(0.025)

(0.023)

(0.025)

(0.041)

0.400***

0.660***

0.673***

1.279***

1.186***

0.937*

(0.011)

(0.027)

(0.019)

(0.023)

(0.024)

(0.031)

0.772***

0.764***

0.577***

1.179***

1.603***

0.747***

(0.022)

(0.04)

(0.023)

(0.027)

(0.037)

(0.035)

5.870***

1.194***

0.634***

0.906***

2.674***

0.752***

(0.12)

(0.058)

(0.026)

(0.023)

(0.058)

(0.036)

1.162***

0.985

0.885***

1.246***

(0.037)

(0.018)

(0.015)

(0.054)

0.869***

0.920***

0.744***

1.473***

Education (baseline: primary school or less)
Secondary school
0.890***
1.054
(technical)
(0.017)
(0.045)
Secondary school
0.714***
0.837***
(general)
(0.013)
(0.036)
Tertiary
Constant (baseline
risk ratio)
Number of
transitions
Number of
observations
Pseudo R-squared

(0.028)

(0.017)

(0.013)

(0.06)

0.604***

0.486***

0.947*

1.226***

0.477***

2.045***

(0.012)

(0.024)

(0.031)

(0.022)

(0.009)

(0.084)

0.006***

0.000***

0.004***

0.004***

0.007***

0.001***

(0)

(0)

(0)

(0)

(0)

(0)

27,534

5,455

12,006

39,676

31,346

9,967

13,928,911
0.046

Note: Coefficients denote relative risk ratios obtained from multinomial logistic regressions, where relative risk ratios are defined as the
relative probability of observing a given outcome relative to the base outcome.Additional covariates included in the regressions include
11 dummy variables for calendar months, a dummy variable for April 2013, and dummy variables for proxies of tenure with current
employer. The regressions are estimated for monthly transitions from April 2012 to April 2014, thus including 12 months before and
after the legislative change (in addition to April 2013, when the new law went into effect in the middle of the month). *, ** and *** denote
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors clustered by individual are in parentheses.
Source: Own calculations based on combined unemployment and employment registry data, Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia.

2.086***
(0.172)

(0.011)

(0.38)

0.639***

3.658***

(0.04)

(0.25)

0.912**

3.725***

(0.042)

n.a.

n.a.

1.126***

(0.043)

1.255***

(0.042)

1.177***

(2)

(0.042)

0.553***

(0.06)

0.890*

(0.034)

0.903***

(0.028)

0.929**

(0.041)

1.059

(3)

(0.027)

0.730***

(0.025)

0.839***

(0.015)

0.869***

(0.016)

0.946***

(0.032)

1.140***

(4)

(0.01)

0.303***

(0.019)

0.599***

(0.016)

0.720***

(0.016)

0.711***

(0.024)

0.718***

(5)

Fixed-term
Permanent
Unemployment
Unemployment –
without unemp. employment – new employment – new – with unemp.
benefits
employer
employer
benefits

Relative risk ratio of transition from permanent employment into:

(0.042)

0.474***

(0.048)

0.616***

(0.025)

0.619***

(0.022)

0.700***

(0.035)

0.695***

(6)

Selfemployment

Note: Coefficients denote relative risk ratios of multinomial logit regressions estimated for each age group separately, where relative risk ratios are defined as the relative
probability of observing a given outcome relative to the base outcome. For each age group, the following covariates are included: gender, education (4 categories), dummy
variables for calendar months, a dummy variable for April 2013 and dummy variables for proxies of tenure with the current employer. “n.a.” refers to labour market
states/transitions for which there were too few observations for reliable estimates. The regressions are estimated for monthly transitions from April 2012 to April 2014,
thus including 12 months before and after the legislative change (in addition to April 2013, when the new law went into effect in the middle of the month). *, ** and ***
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors clustered by individual are in parentheses.
Source: Own calculations based on combined unemployment and employment registry data, Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia.

Aged 55+

Aged 50-55

Aged 40-49

Aged 30-39

Aged 16-29

Effects of the new law, age-specific effects

(1)

Inactivity

Table A6: Multinomial logit estimates of the monthly probability of transition from permanent employment to different labour
market states – age-specific effects of the legislative changes
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Table A7: Multinomial logit estimates of the monthly probability of transition from
unemployment to different labour market states
Relative risk ratio of transition from unemployment into:
Fixed-term
Permanent
Self-employment
employment – new
employment – new
employer
employer
(1)
(2)
(3)
Effects of the legislative changes (baseline: old law)
New law
1.027***
1.121***
0.852***
(0.009)
(0.019)
(0.016)
Gender (baseline: men)
Women
0.688***
0.617***
0.99
(0.008)
(0.012)
(0.02)
Age (baseline: under 30 years old)
Aged 30-39
0.843***
0.899***
1.474***
(0.012)
(0.02)
(0.037)
Aged 40-49
0.862***
0.819***
1.591***
(0.014)
(0.021)
(0.045)
Aged 50-55
0.751***
0.529***
1.797***
(0.017)
(0.02)
(0.065)
Aged 55+
0.474***
0.188***
1.274***
(0.013)
(0.011)
(0.051)
Education (baseline: primary school or less)
Secondary school (technical)
1.864***
2.129***
2.123***
(0.032)
(0.066)
(0.076)
Secondary school (general)
1.757***
2.593***
3.202***
(0.03)
(0.078)
(0.108)
Tertiary
2.420***
4.226***
5.794***
(0.046)
(0.137)
(0.208)
Constant (baseline risk ratio)
0.078***
0.021***
0.006***
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0)
Number of transitions
68,302
15,521
13,225
Number of observations
2,009,846
Pseudo R-squared
0.172
Note: Coefficients denote relative risk ratios obtained from multinomial logistic regressions, where relative
risk ratios are defined as the relative probability of observing a given outcome relative to the base outcome.
Additional covariates included in the regressions include a dummy variable for receipt of unemployment
benefits, 11 dummy variables for calendar months and a dummy variable for April 2013. The regressions are
estimated for monthly transitions from April 2012 to April 2014, thus including 12 months before and after the
legislative change (in addition to April 2013, when the new law went into effect in the middle of the month). *,
** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors clustered
by individual are in parentheses.
Source: Own calculations based on combined unemployment and employment registry data, Statistical Office
of the Republic of Slovenia.
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Table A8: Multinomial logit estimates of the monthly probability of transition
from unemployment to different labour market states – age-specific effects of the
legislative changes
Relative risk ratio of transition from unemployment into:
Fixed-term
employment – new
employer

Permanent
employment – new
employer

Self-employment

(1)

(2)

(3)

1.153***

1.294***

1.407***

(0.016)

(0.034)

(0.049)

1.006

1.05

0.952

(0.016)

(0.032)

(0.031)

1.033*

1.062

0.717***

(0.019)

(0.04)

(0.028)

0.900***

0.912

0.455***

(0.025)

(0.061)

(0.026)

0.717***

1.161

0.331***

(0.026)

(0.128)

(0.025)

Effects of the new law, age-specific effects
Aged 16-29

Aged 30-39

Aged 40-49

Aged 50-55

Aged 55+

Note: Coefficients denote relative risk ratios obtained from separate multinomial logistic regressions estimated
by age group. Relative risk ratios are defined as the relative probability of observing a given outcome relative to
the base outcome. For each age group, the following covariates are included: gender, educations (4 categories),
dummy variables for calendar months and a dummy variable for April 2013. “n.a.” refers to labour market
states/transitions for which there were too few observations for reliable estimates. The regressions are
estimated for monthly transitions from April 2012 to April 2014, thus including 12 months before and after the
legislative change (in addition to April 2013, when the new law went into effect in the middle of the month). *,
** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors clustered
by individual are in parentheses.
Source: Own calculations based on combined unemployment and employment registry data, Statistical Office
of the Republic of Slovenia.

